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ABSTRACT 
 
It seems that an ever-shorter temporal rhythm is gaining ground with the end 
of the “short twentieth century,” 1 challenging the modern temporal horizon. The 
emerging economy relies on a continuous stream of scientific and technical knowledge 
closely related to information technology and networks. The increasing compression of 
both time and space has major consequences for the governance of the economy and 
the setting of authoritative standards in this sphere. This paper explores the 
consequences for education and training and its governance, where continuing 
education has become crucial. It studies the setting of authoritative standards in the 
field of information and communication technology (ICT) training, which has become 
vital for the knowledge-based economy. I will show how the standardization of these 
trainings by way of third-party certifiers establishes a mode of private coordination 
between companies, sectors and across national borders. A closer examination of 
competing claims to authority in this field provides interesting insights into the enabling 
conditions of this mode of coordination and also brings a geopolitical dimension to the 
fore. I.	INTRODUCTION	
This paper studies the global market in further education, and the enabling 
conditions for standard settings in this field. Further education has become crucial in a  
“perpetual innovation economy.”2 With knowledge, information and communication 
technology (ICT) at its center, the perpetual innovation economy has paved the way for 
“reflexive business knowledge” 3  and a “new spirit of capitalism.” 4  This new 
																																																								
* I would like to thank Poul F. Kjaer for his comments on a previous version of this contribution and 
Kathleen Thelen for a very inspiring conversation. The usual disclaimer applies. The contribution has 
been developed with support from the European Research Council within the project Institutional 
Transformation in European Political Economy–A Socio-legal Approach (ITEPE-312331). 
** Eva Hartmann is a lecturer in the Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge. She has published 
widely in German, English, and French on the internationalization of higher education, cross-border 
labor mobility, international social policy, international economic sociology, and the role of law in 
International Political Economy. Her current research project examines the role of multinational 
companies in promoting the internationalization of education and skill policies and standards. Email: 
ebh27@cam.ac.uk, Orcid: 0000-0002-7591-2341. 
1 See generally ERIC HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY 1914-1991 
(Abacus 1995) (1994) (labeling the period from 1914 to 1991 as “the Short Twentieth Century”). 
2 DAN SCHILLER, DIGITAL CAPITALISM 157 (1999) (citing Tessa Morris-Suzuki). 
3 See generally NIGEL THRIFT, KNOWING CAPITALISM 75–91 (Mike Featherstone ed., 2005) (detailing 
the rise of reflexive business knowledge’s globalization in capitalism). 
4 See generally LUC BOLTANSKI & ÈVE CHIAPELLO, DER NEUE GEIST DES KAPITALISMUS [THE NEW 
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM] (2003) (arguing that capitalism took on a new spirit after the 1970s when it 
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development is supported by what Chris Muellerleile and Susan Robertson call the 
digital bureau, alluding to Weber’s notion of rule-based rationality that has now become 
digital rationality.5 However, this digital infrastructure would be of little relevance in 
the absence of skills that allow the best use to be made of it. Against this broader 
backdrop, we can better understand the increasing importance of ICT training and 
certification, giving rise to what Clifford Adelman calls a “parallel universe of 
postsecondary credentials.” 6  This private universe provides its standard-setting 
services, not only to individuals and companies, but also to public higher education 
(HE) institutions. Like continuing education and training (CET) in general, the parallel 
universe blurs the lines between formal, non-formal, and informal education. Many 
certifications build on each other, emulating the distinction between primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education. A number of programs require prior work experience 
in the relevant field and recognize it subsequently by a certification issued upon 
completion of the course. The training programs often go beyond technical skills in a 
narrow sense. They also test soft skills such as organizational skills, attentiveness, and 
self-reliance, and evaluate personal attributes such as motivation, ethics, and 
diplomacy. 
ICT training providers and certifiers are merely the tip of the iceberg looming 
in the private “parallel universe of post-secondary credentials” (Adelman). The body 
of this iceberg is a plethora of institutes, professional associations, and for-profit firms 
that have entered the continuing education and training market. A case in point is 
Mercer, one of the largest human resources consulting firms with about 22,000 
																																																								
abandoned the hierarchical Fordist work structure and developed a new network-based form of 
organization at the cost of material and psychological security). 
5 Chris Muellerleile & Susan L. Robertson, Digital Weberianism: Bureaucracy, Information, and the 
Techno-Rationality of Neoliberal Capitalism, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 1, XX (2018).  
6 Clifford Adelman, A Parallel Universe: Certification in the Information Technology Guild, 32 
CHANGE 20, 20 (2000). 
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employees operating in more than 140 countries.7 Mercer provides human resource 
management (HRM) training to a broad range of companies. Manpower Group 
provides similar services by combining executive research with recruitment services 
and human resource (HR) training on a global scale.8 It has enhanced the skills of over 
eleven million individuals by way of its training and development center.9 
In this contribution, I will first outline the broader context of this parallel 
universe and the challenges it poses to the literature that seeks to identify varieties of 
capitalism. I will show that the certifiers make a coordination possible that is neither 
typical for coordinated market economies nor for liberal market economies. It is rather 
part of an emerging, genuinely international political economy. I will turn to the 
literature of international private authority with a view to getting a better understanding 
of this mode of coordination and the setting of international private standards. Going 
beyond a simple mapping of the different modes, I am particularly interested in the 
enabling conditions of the authority of these private standards. The analytical 
framework developed in the first part will provide the backdrop against which I will 
explore the different ways in which the international training providers seek to underpin 
their authority. The study focuses on ICT training since this type of further training has 
become the most internationalized form. I will conclude by highlighting the role of the 
EU in underpinning one type of private authority and its geopolitical implications.  
II. THE WILLIAMSONIAN TURN 
It would be too simple to equate the emerging “parallel universe of 
																																																								
7 About Mercer, MERCER, https://www.mercer.com/about-mercer.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
8 See KORN FERRY, http://www.kornferry.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2017); Manpower, 
MANPOWERGROUP, http://www.manpowergroup.com/workforce-solutions/manpower (last visited Oct. 
5, 2017). 
9 ManpowerGroup Corporate Fact Sheet 2016, MANPOWERGROUP, 
http://www.manpowergroup.com/wps/wcm/connect/0f410928-6700-4a10-a6cb-
e697b7df7e94/ManpowerGroup-Fact-Sheet-13.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
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postsecondary credential” 10  with the privatization of public education. Such a 
conclusion overlooks the long tradition of vocational and corporate education 
companies have provided. The way the training had been organized has, however, 
changed over time, reflecting a major struggle over the ownership of knowledge 
between the crafts, the employers, and the employees with their representatives.11 The 
parallel universe is part of a new, important change. Drawing on a distinction 
introduced by the German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, we can understand it as a 
move from a “Durkheimian” to a “Williamsonian” type of institutional organization of 
the private sector transforming the “coordinated market economy” (CME). 12  The 
Williamsonian turn underpins decentralization, fragmentation, and diversification in 
the coordination of the economy, where competition has become intensified. This 
change, Streeck argues, weakens the networks among firms, as well as the role of trade 
unions, especially in countries where trade unions once had a say in the design of 
vocational and corporate education.  
Kathleen Thelen and Marius R. Busemeyer have studied the consequences of 
the Williamsonian turn for vocational and corporate education, and identified a move 
to segmentalism.13 Segmentalism differs from the collectivism of CMEs and its cross-
sectoral coordination. However, segmentalism also differs from the neo-liberal laissez-
faire of liberal market economies (LMEs) where short-term and adversarial relations 
between the different economic actors prevail, with major consequences for firm-based 																																																								
10 See Adelman, supra note 6, at 20. 
11 For an excellent overview, see KATHLEEN THELEN & MARIUS R. BUSEMEYER, Institutional Change 
in German Vocational Training: From Collectivism toward Segmentalism, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE SKILL FORMATION 68, 68–100 (Marius R. Busemeyer & Christine 
Trampusch eds., 2012). 
12 See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE GERMAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 157 (2009); see also VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) (discussing 
CMEs in greater detail). 
13 See generally THELEN & BUSEMEYER, supra note 11, at 87. See also Martin Baethge, Glanz und 
Elend des Deutschen Korporatismus in der Berufsbildung, 52 WSI MITTEILUNGEN 489 (1999). 
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education and training. The hire-and-fire approach of managerial unilateralism in 
LMEs creates few incentives to invest in the training of employees.  
In her study of the emerging segmentalism, Thelen refers to the Japanese 
keiretsu system as the historical predecessor that emerged after World War II. 14 
Different suppliers across a broad range of industries are grouped in this system around 
a major manufacturer, a trading company and/or a bank. Informal business groups, 
established through interlocking business relationships and shareholdings along the 
lines of major conglomerates, are key coordinators. The form corporate education has 
taken in this system mirrors this broader structure. The conglomerates with their large 
internal labor market provide skills that are in close alignment with their needs. In more 
general terms, segmentalism thus describes a constellation where large companies keep 
investing in the qualifications of their employees. However, they use the power of their 
size to ask for very firm-specific skills to the detriment of the more holistic principle of 
(regulated) occupation (Berufsprinzip) that used to inform collectivist arrangements. 15 
Thelen and Busemeyer have made a very important intervention into the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) discussion; their analysis makes it possible to refute the 
convergence thesis, according to which CMEs are about to be transformed into liberal 
market economies (LMEs). The Williamsonian turn and segmentalism point to an 
important transformation of coordination that is neither a CME type nor a LME type. 
Maybe because Thelen and Busemeyer have the Japanese model in mind, their analysis 
focuses on large companies and the way they use their internal labor market to promote 
the modularization of firm-based training. They pay surprisingly little attention to the 
increasingly internationally active providers of further education and training, which 
																																																								
14 See KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE 172–73 (2004). 
15 See Mari Sako, Skill Testing and Certification in Japan 3 (Econ, Dev. Inst. of the World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 95-02, 1995). 
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are at the center of this contribution. In the next two sections, I will explore in more 
detail what we can learn from the literature on transnational private authority in order 
to better understand these providers, their standard-setting authority and their role in a 
global economy. 
III. TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE AUTHORITY 
A significant body of literature on private transnational authority has emerged 
in recent years, examining how private actors have become important as “makers of 
global public policy.”16 Susan George refers to multinational companies as “shadow 
sovereigns.”17 Given their market power and size, they do indeed resemble the keiretsu 
system with its large conglomerates. The “giant firms,”18 as Colin Crouch calls them, 
use their “extrastatecraft”19 to establish a global economic infrastructure. We could 
consider the East India Company, or the company-state as Philip Stern calls it in his 
study, a historical forerunner.20  But the extrastatecrafting has become much more 
sophisticated and diverse, mirroring the increased complexity of the global economy. 
Some companies have specialized in providing international coordination services. 
Timothy Sinclaire’s study, for instance, points out how rating agencies have established 
a new global infrastructure in reaction to the weakening of the banks’ role as 
																																																								
16 See Timothy J. Sinclaire, The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory Mechanisms 
and the New Global Finance, 7 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 441, 441–51 (2001). For an excellent introduction 
on how transnational corporations gain prominence see Evelyne Léonard et al., Multinational 
Corporations as Political Players, 20 TRANSFER: EUR. REV. LAB. & RES. 171, 173–75 (2014). 
17 See generally SUSAN GEORGE, SHADOW SOVEREIGNS: HOW GLOBAL CORPORATIONS ARE SEIZING 
POWER (2015) (analyzing the rise of shadow sovereigns and their increasing reach into the global 
economic order by way of lobbying governments and international organizations). 
18 Colin Crouch, The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic Capitalism, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 148, 148–72 (David Coen, Wyn Grant, & 
Graham Wilson eds., 2010). 
19 See generally KELLER EASTERLING, EXTRASTATECRAFT 15 (2014) (defining extrastatecraft as “a 
portmanteau describing the often undisclosed activities outside of, in addition to, and sometimes even 
in partnership with statecraft”). 
20 See PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MODERN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011). 
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intermediaries between lenders and borrowers.21 Claire Cutler describes this type of 
service providers accordingly as “international coordination firms.”22 
One way of studying the internationalization of private coordination is by way 
of exploring the conditions underpinning their authority. Max Weber pointed out that 
not every power has authority.23 An entity—be it a person, an organization, or an 
office—can be in authority, that is, have the right to command. It is, however, only an 
authority when it has the credibility and legitimacy to command. What provides 
credibility and legitimacy has changed over time, moving from traditional and 
charismatic authority to the legal-rational authority of modern capitalist societies. But 
rules and law are necessary but not yet sufficient conditions to turn an entity in authority 
into an authority in modern societies, Weber argues. The authority needs to draw on 
substantive rationality, which delineates the goals of actions in terms of ethical 
imperatives and expediential and precautionary rules.24 This has major implications for 
the enabling conditions of a Weberian notion of  legitimacy. Without the substantive 
rationality, formal rationality lacks legitimacy. It risks becoming an iron cage deprived 
of the capacity to make the wall of the cage porous again, so that the broader societal 
context can be considered. Weber studied national societies, but a number of scholars 
have used his account of power fruitfully in analyzing the authority of international 
organizations in setting standards and disseminating them as part of the expertise they 
																																																								
21 See Sinclair, supra note 16, at 444; see also Chris Muellerleile, Calming Speculative Traffic: An 
Infrastructural Theory of Financial Markets, Economic Geography (forthcoming) (arguing that the 
concept of infrastructure offers geographers a useful framework to understand the resilient influence of 
financial markets on the socioeconomy). 
22 See A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE EMERGENCE 
OF PRIVATE: AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 28 (Rodney Bruce Halland & Thomas J. 
Biersteker eds., 2002); see also Andreas Nölke, Private International Norms in Global Economic 
Governance: Coordination Service Firms and Corporate Governance (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 
Working Paper No. 06/2003, 2003) (explaining transnational private self-regulation’s impact on the 
current national models of corporate governance). 
23 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 212–216 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
24 See id. at 85. 
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provide.25 But how do private actors gain authority in setting international standards? 
The literature on transnational private authority provides interesting insights. 
 
IV. ENABLING CONDITIONS 
The capacity to provide exclusive expertise across national borders is vital for 
transnational private authority. The expertise can take different forms. In his study of 
the authority of rating agencies, Sinclaire points out the importance of the capacity to 
produce knowledge of “particular circumstances of time and place”26 while also being 
able to simplify it. For rating agencies, simplification takes place by way of a 
combination of As, Bs, and Cs. Hence, the authority of this type of expertise is based 
on the capacity to simultaneously account for and reduce the complexity of reality. 
Similarly, contextualization and abstraction characterize the global rankings of 
universities. However, this reduction of complexity does not have a coordination effect 
if it has to compete with too many other suggestions for reducing complexity. The 
evaluation of rating agencies, for instance, will no longer influence economic decisions 
if there are too many rating agencies of equal reputation providing very different 
results.27 In other words, the authority of private evaluations and standards also depends 
on their capacity to keep competing interpretations at bay. One way of gaining such 
authority is borrowing the exclusivity of public authority by integrating public entities 
into an international standard-setting process. The exact composition of private and 
public entities constituting such “global hybrids” 28  can differ. Some international 
																																																								
25 For a first important attempt see Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power and 
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999). 
26 Sinclaire, supra note 16, at 443. 
27 It is no coincidence therefore that there are only three big rating agencies: Standard & Poor's, 
Moody's, and Fitch Group. 
28 See Jean-Christophe Graz, Standardizing Services: Transnational Authority and Market Power, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRODUCTION 132, 140 (Kees Van der Pijl 
ed., 2015). 
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norms include very few public bodies, while others give them a stronger say so that the 
standards gain a quasi-public status. A case in point is the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO).29 Many of the standard-setting bodies that are involved in 
developing ISO standards include representatives of public authorities. The integration 
of public entities increases the legitimacy of the exclusivity of ISO standards, turning 
them into an important international reference. Such legitimacy is particularly relevant 
when private standards are used in international dispute settlements regulated by 
international public law, where states are still the main legal subject. Providing purely 
private standards with such a quasi-public law status is still hotly contested.30 
The inclusion of a broad range of different private actors is another way to 
ensure the legitimacy of standards. A well-studied case is the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC). Maria Tysiachniouk calls the FSC a “governance generating network 
(GGN)”31 and points out the key role of deliberation underpinning the global authority 
of its standards.32 Every third year the members of FSC meet to discuss the guidelines 
for forest management, which inform the certifications of forest management and forest 
products the FSC carries out. The governance generating networks illustrate the 
importance of mediation between the particular context and the general principles 
informing the guidelines. The standards this mediation produces are more likely to be 
																																																								
29 This not-for-profit international organization with 162 national members has published over 21,000 
international standards and related documents, which cover almost every industry, from technology to 
food safety, agriculture, healthcare, and more recently education. See generally CRAIG MURPHY & 
JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) 25–45 (2009) 
(discussing ISO’s structure and functions); KRISTINA TAMM HALLSTRÖM, ORGANIZING 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 27–29 (2004) (discussing the history and function of ISO). 
30 See generally Jill E. Hobbs, Public and Private Standards for Food Safety and Quality: International 
Trade Implications, 11 ESTEY CTR. J. INT’L L. & TRADE POL’Y 136 (2010) (discussing problems with 
private standards in intergovernmental agreements). 
31 MARIA S. TYSIACHNIOUK, TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH PRIVATE AUTHORITY 71 
(2012). 
32 See KRISTINA TAMM HALLSTRÖM & MAGNUS BOSTRÖM, TRANSNATIONAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER 
STANDARDIZATION (2010); see also Jaye Ellis, Constitutionalization of Nongovernmental Certifiation 
Programs, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 1035 (2013) (discussing the authority and the validity of 
the rules, standards, and decision-making processes that certification programs have put in place). 
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perceived as representing the general interest and general rules imposed from the top. 
Deliberation and mediation are thus vital for establishing what Weber calls substantive 
rationality, making the iron cage of rules more porous, so that the broader societal 
context can be considered. They make private standards more responsive to their 
environment and, as a consequence, increase the legitimacy of international rules and 
standards.  
In other words, private standards gain authority if they are perceived, firstly, to 
be capable of simultaneously accounting for and reducing the complexity of reality, 
and secondly, to represent the general interest. In both cases they need to be able to 
keep competing interpretations at bay in order to ensure the coordination effect of their 
standards. The remainder of this article will study the extent to which these enabling 
conditions are also vital for establishing the private authority of ICT training and 
certifications. 
V. THE PRIVATE AUTHORITY OF ICT TRAINING33 
The certification of ICT skills has become a global trend. A recent survey 
focusing on European Union (EU) countries estimated that up to 50 percent of the 6.67 
million members of the ICT workforce in the EU have at least one ICT certification.34 
Many of these certifications are valid only for a certain period of time and thus need an 
upgrade, which turns ICT training and certification into a fast-growing business. 
TrainingIndustry.com, an online publication platform for IT trainers, estimates the 
																																																								
33 See generally Eva Hartmann, Education Outside the Public Limelight: The “Parallel Universe” of 
ICT Certifiers, in WORLD YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION 2016 228 (Antoni Verger, Christopher Lubienski 
& Gita Steiner-Khamsi eds., 2016) (exploring the privatization of post-secondary education by 
studying ICT training and certification). 
34 WERNER B. KORTE ET AL., TOWARDS A EUROPEAN QUALITY LABEL FOR ICT INDUSTRY TRAINING 
AND CERTIFICATION 49 (2013). See also KARSTEN GAREIS ET AL., E-SKILLS FOR JOBS IN EUROPE: 
MEASURING PROGRESS AND MOVING AHEAD (2014) (examining the development of ICT practitioner 
skills in Europe). 
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global volume of this training and certification market was $2.62 billion in 2014.35 
However, the exact size of the market is difficult to determine due to a lack of reliable 
data.  
There is a plethora of different certifications, creating a rather fragmented and 
confusing landscape containing both key and niche players. In his study of the parallel 
universe, mainly focusing on the USA, Adelman lists over 100 ICT certifiers who offer 
more than 1,300 individual certification products.36 In this study I will distinguish 
between three (ideal) types of certifiers: formal post-secondary education providers, 
vendor-specific certifiers, and vendor-independent certifiers.37 They all differ in terms 
of the enabling conditions of their authority. 
Formal post-secondary education has the least authority. This may come as a 
surprise given that higher education was for thirty years the main sphere for qualifying 
ICT professionals.38 However, such programs came under a great deal of pressure in 
the 1980s, when the demand for developers and programmers substantially increased. 
This change opened the door for individuals with qualifications outside the electrical 
engineering discipline. While post-secondary education institutions still have formal 
authority, they are often seen as too slow in their reaction to be able to adjust quickly 
enough to new skill needs.39 Thus, they have lost the status of an authority while still 
being in authority to award degrees.40  
																																																								
35 IT Training, TRAINING INDUSTRY, https://www.trainingindustry.com/wiki/entries/it-training.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
36 Adelman, supra note 6. 
37 See Roman Povalej & Peter Weiß, Survey of ICT Certification Systems for ICT Professionals in 
Europe, UPGRADE, June 2007, at 36, 39. 
38 Thomas Hoyle, Credentials for Success: An Evolution in the It Industry, T+D, July 2010, at 48, 48. 
See generally J. GLENN BROOKSHEAR, COMPUTER SCIENCE (12th ed. 2014) (providing an overview of 
computer science). 
39 See JOSHUA HAIMSON & MICHELLE VANNOY, DEVELOPING THE IT WORKFORCE: CERTIFICATION 
PROGRAMS, PARTICIPANTS AND OUTCOMES IN HIGH SCHOOLS AND TWO-YEAR COLLEGES xi (2004). 
40 However, a closer look at the wage structure in the ICT labor market indicates that formal 
qualifications continue to be decisive at the upper end of the qualification scale. The parallel universe 
has predominately gained momentum at bachelor’s and master’s degree levels, where ICT certificates – 
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In reaction, many HE institutions have started to “borrow” authority by way of 
outsourcing part of their IT training and testing to private ICT certifiers. Some HE 
institutions have even agreed to waive some of their general entrance requirements for 
holders of ICT certifications.41 This loss of public authority illustrates well how the 
acceleration of economic processes, translating into important changes of the time 
horizon, has undermined the standard-setting and coordination role of public 
institutions. The weakening of this type of coordination is an important reason why 
private standard setters have gained in importance in a Williamsonian era. However, 
the conditions underpinning the authority of vendor-specific certifiers and vendor-
independent certifiers differ fundamentally, as I will show in the next sections. 
VI. VENDOR-SPECIFIC CERTIFIERS 
Vendor-specific certifiers have become the most important standard setters. 42 
Selling training and certification that is closely related to the certifiers’ own software is 
part of their diversification strategy. Microsoft, for instance, awards the title of 
Microsoft Technology Associate, which can be upgraded to Microsoft Certified 
Solutions Associate or, with further training, to Microsoft Certified Solutions Expert. 
A study by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training 
(CEDEFOP) lists over eighty vendor-specific certifiers.43 Important players include 
Microsoft, Adobe, Cisco, Oracle, Novell, Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsystems. 
In many cases, the software companies do not provide the training themselves 
but authorize training centers to train. For instance, to become a Microsoft learning 
																																																								
not degrees – are more likely to determine wage levels, according to a number of studies: See Kenneth 
R. Bartlett et al., The Perceived Influence of Industry-Sponsored Credentials on the Recruitment 
Process in the Information Technology Industry: Employer and Employee Perspective, 21 J. CAREER & 
TECH. EDU. 51 (2005); Jones Tegan et al., Certmag’s 2006 Salary Survey, CERTIFICATION MAG., Dec. 
2006, at 16. This is less likely to be the case for ICT professionals with a PhD. 
41 See SCHILLER, supra note 2, at 143–202. 
42 See CEDEFOP, ICT SKILLS CERTIFICATION IN EUROPE 8 (2006); Adelman, supra note 6, at 20–29. 
43 CEDEFOP, supra note 42, at 102–11. 
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partner, the center’s staff has to undergo thorough training in different Microsoft 
products and they must pass an exam.44  
The authority of the vendor-certifiers is a stand-alone authority, which means 
that they are not accredited by a legislative and professional authority, as is the case 
with many other certifiers.45 The source of their authority is their software and the 
oligopolistic structure of the software market, backed up by the exclusivity guaranteed 
by intellectual property rights. Their authority benefits from a winner-takes-all logic. 
The larger the market share, the more likely employers know the certification, which 
increases the certification’s value across national borders.46 In light of global migration, 
widely known certifications benefit from the attractiveness of the labor market of the 
certifier’s home country. IT professionals from low-income countries may take an exam 
offered by an internationally known certifier to improve their access to high-income 
labor markets. Some immigration authorities have started to use this type of 
certification alongside formal qualifications in assigning work permits.47 Certifiers also 
benefit from the international activities of other service providers. Multinational 
companies are likely to prefer employees with certifications they know when they 
employ abroad. Internationally known certifications also play an important 
organizational role in the field of subcontracting. They can become indicators of the 
subcontracting companies’ quality, especially when these companies are situated in 
countries with a formal education system that is substantially different from that of the 
outsourcing companies’ country of origin. These different examples illustrate the 
important role that vendor-specific certifiers have started to play, not only as providers 
																																																								
44 See Microsoft Learning Partner: Requirements, Benefits, How to Become One, WINDOWS CLUB, 
http://www.thewindowsclub.com/microsoft-learning-partner (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
45 See PHILIPPE TISSOT, TERMINOLOGY OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING POLICY 18 (2004). 
46 See Kathryn Tyler, Carve Out Training?, HR MAG., Feb. 2004, at 52, 54. 
47 See, e.g., Kellye Whitney, The International Market for Certification, CERTIFICATION MAG., May 9, 
2007 at 20, 23. 
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of skills and standards for education in an international “credential society”48. They also 
help improve coordination between firms, across sectors and national borders. Scholars 
who merely focus on country-specific modes of coordination risk overlooking this 
emerging international mode of coordination. 
However, the strength of vendor-specific certifiers is also their weakness. Their 
oligopolistic market power raises major concerns. They have been criticized for being 
too biased toward their own solutions and technology, and are seen as only being 
interested in building a pool of trusted individuals who know how to implement and 
support their product.49  It is feared that such a bias could easily lead to incorrect 
resource allocations and undermine the general interest. Against the backdrop of these 
limits we can better understand the enabling conditions of the authority of vendor-
independent certifiers.  
VII. VENDOR-INDEPENDENT CERTIFIERS 
The training and certification vendor-independent providers offer differ in terms 
of content. They focus more on issues, techniques, skills, and knowledge that are 
independent of a specific ICT product, and are therefore often more generic in their 
orientation. But they are also more inclusive in their institutional set-up. Some 
providers are closely affiliated with associations of IT professionals. A case in point is 
the British Computer Society (BCS) and its Chartered Institute for IT.50 BCS provides 
predominately IT training and certification in the British context, but has also started to 
expand its services overseas by way of its 100 accredited training organizations. One 
of the most important profession-based certifiers is the Council of European 
																																																								
48 See generally RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY (1979) (explaining the rise of the 
credential system and education’s role in standardizing it). 
49 See Matthew French, Why IT Certification Matters, TECHCENTRAL (Apr. 6, 2010), 
https://techcentral.co.za/why-it-certification-matters/13743/. 
50 BRITISH COMPUT. SOC’Y, http://certifications.bcs.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
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Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS), which was established in 1989 by nine 
European informatics societies and has over 450,000 ICT and informatics professionals 
as members in thirty-two European countries. 51  CEPIS offers the European 
Certification of Informatics Professionals (EUCIP) for IT professionals, as well as the 
European/International Computer Driving Licence (ECDL/ICDL) certification 
program designed for a broader clientele. ECDL/ICDL certification has been awarded 
to more than 14 million people in over 100 countries via a network of nearly 24,000 
ECDL Accredited Test Centres (ATCs).52 
Other vendor-independent standard setters are affiliated with trade associations. 
A case in point is the Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA), which 
is a coalition of 200 IT vendors and IT distributors. CompTIA is headquartered in 
Chicago with offices in different Commonwealth countries and has awarded its main 
certification, CompTIA A+, to 1 million certified IT professionals since its creation in 
1993.53  
In many respects, vendor-independent certifiers resemble national corporatist 
arrangements, and many are indeed involved in setting national standards. They include 
different stakeholders in the standard setting, although hardly ever trade unions. The 
inclusiveness of professional and trade associations helps their standards to gain 
authority and to get recognized as being in the general interest. However, a number of 
aspects undermine their authority. First and foremost, these standard setters have no 
way to ensure the exclusivity of their standards. On the contrary, as service providers 
they have to constantly develop new standards that differentiate them from other 
certifiers on the certification market. Against the backdrop of this need for 																																																								
51 See COUNCIL OF EUR. PROF’L INFORMATICS SOC’YS, http://www.cepis.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
52 See Programmes, ECDL, http://ecdl.org/about-ecdl/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
53 CompTIA A+: Exam Codes 220-901 & 220-902, COMPTIA, 
https://certification.comptia.org/certifications/a (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
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diversification, we can better understand why the 100 ICT providers that Adelman lists 
provide more than 1,300 individual certification products.54 The result is an ever more 
fragmented and confusing landscape of certifications that lack transparency and 
comparability, which in turn undermines their coordination role. This shortcoming 
provides very interesting insights into the challenges that this type of corporatist standard 
setters is facing. 
VIII. TOWARD A EUROPEAN CORPORATISM? 
The fact that the Council of European Professional Informatics Societies 
(CEPIS) is an important exception in this context, with the 14 million people in over 
100 countries to whom it has awarded European/International Computer Driving 
Licence so far, is remarkable. A closer study of the enabling conditions of its authority 
brings the role of the public back into the picture. However, this public is no longer a 
national one. In 2003, CEPIS got important financial support from the EU to develop, 
together with the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), standards for ICT 
professionals in all industry sectors. However, it was not only CEPIS with its different 
national member organizations that developed the standards. The whole process was 
supported by a broad alliance also including large companies like the German Deutsche 
Telekom and the European consortium Airbus, and universities, and last but not least 
Microsoft and Cisco. The process resulted in 40 ICT competences constituting the 
European e-Competence Framework (e-CF), which became the European standard EN 
16234-1-3 in 2016. Once the standards were established they were further strengthened 
by being associated with a number of other EU policy instruments. They have become 
part of the EU strategy for e-Skills in the twenty-first century, the Digital Skills and 
Jobs Coalition the European Commission developed in the framework of the Digital 
																																																								
54 Adelman, supra note 6. 
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Single Market strategy and the new Skills Agenda for Europe.55 Last but not least, the 
standards have become integrated into the European Qualifications Framework that the 
EU Member States adopted in their effort to establish a European Higher Education 
Area.56  
In other words, the EU has played a vital role in underpinning the standard-
setting by this professional association and providing its standards with exclusivity by 
way of its public policy instruments. It is due to this support that CEPIS has become an 
important standard-setting authority at European and international levels, providing an 
alternative to the vendor-specific certifications. The fact that many of the vendor-
specific certifiers have their headquarters in the USA indicates an important 
geopolitical dimension that underpins the competition over normative authority and 
international coordination. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that the parallel universe of post-secondary credentials 
needs to be seen as part of an emerging transnational private coordination. In the vein 
of Streeck’s (2009) study of the reform of capitalism, I have related this change to what 
he describes as a move toward a Williamsonian type of coordination. Thelen and 
Busemeyer have outlined how large firms have started to design their own VET in this 
context, mainly reflecting their firm-specific needs. According to their argument, this 
segmentalism undermines the cooperative arrangements in coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), with their monitoring and oversight mechanisms, that ensure a 
degree of cross-sectoral standardization in the content and quality of skills. I have 
																																																								
55 See Communication from the Comission to the European Partliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 8, COM (2016) 381 final (Oct. 
6, 2010). 
56 See Martin Sherry et al., Actions Towards Maturing the ICT Profession within Europe, 4 INT’L J. 
HUM. CAP. & INFO. TECH. PROF. 46 (2013). 
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argued that Thelen and Busemayer fail to pay attention to private international modes 
of coordination and standardization. Drawing on the literature on transnational private 
authority and on Weber’s differentiation between an authority and being in authority, I 
have identified three important conditions that private standards need to fulfill to gain 
authority. They need to be perceived as being capable of simultaneously accounting for 
and reducing the complexity of modern economies, as well as representing the general 
interest. In order to have a coordination effect they require a high degree of exclusivity 
that allows them to become a general reference for very different actors.  
Against this theoretical background, I have studied in more detail two different 
private modes of ensuring an international standardization in the field of ICT education 
and training: one provided by vendor-specific certifications and one by vendor-
independent certifications. The study has outlined how vendor-specific certifiers have 
gained global authority. The propriety standards of their software provide them with an 
important exclusivity that underpins their coordination role. However, the strength they 
gain through proprietary standards has an important flipside. Their standards raise 
concerns about a strong bias in the coordination that might be in contradiction to the 
general interest. They may also have difficulties in accounting for the specificity of a 
context due to the rigid standardization they impose. This standardization and the 
secrecy of the algorithms reduce the capacity of its users to adapt the standards to their 
specific context. In contrast, the authority of vendor-independent certifications is likely 
to be perceived as more legitimate, not least due to the broader range of different 
stakeholders that were involved in the standard development and the higher context-
sensitivity. However, the openness of these norm setters can turn into a weakness. As 
long as they disseminate their standards by way of the market, they are forced 
constantly to produce new standards to distinguish themselves from other certifiers. 
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The result is an ever more fragmented and confusing landscape of vendor-independent 
certifications that undermines the coordination capacity of this type of private authority. 
It is in this context that the close collaboration between the EU and the Council for 
European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) made a major difference. The 
public policy instruments of the EU made it possible for CEPIS to become a European 
and international alternative, at least in some areas, to the vendor-specific certifiers, 
many of them headquartered in the USA. Hence, the question of international 
coordination has an important geopolitical dimension.  
However, much more research is needed to bring this emerging private sphere 
of post-secondary education and its coordination effects further into the public 
limelight. I hope to have shown with this case study that such a research program is not 
only relevant for scholars interested in the internationalization of (corporate) education. 
It also provides interesting insights into emerging transnational modes of coordination 
that studies of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) have failed to account for so far. It 
seems that once again the focus on corporate education could be an excellent entrance 
point for a better understanding of an emerging mode of coordination, even though this 
kind of coordination differs considerably from those prevailing in LMEs and CMEs.  
